Traders in cash equities may be grappling with the newfangled concept of kill switches. But for traders working in listed options, they’re old hat.
Known variously as “risk monitor” or “risk limitation” mechanisms, these exchange-operated devices have been protecting options market makers from losses for eight or nine years.
Now, after a spate of algo blowups, there are moves afoot to tighten existing mechanisms and introduce new ones. (In options, the notable case was the Ronin Capital glitch in February, when the market maker disrupted trading at NYSE Amex with more than 30,000 wildly mispriced quotes.)
NYSE Euronext, for instance, recently introduced changes to its kill switch that are expected to help market makers avoid unnecessary quote kick-outs and produce more purges when they’re actually needed.
Nasdaq OMX Group executives are making plans to widen the scope of the exchange operator’s Rapid Fire risk-protection system in ways that could lead to wholesale shutdowns of dealer quotes.
Systems such as Rapid Fire are relatively simple mechanisms for managing risk. They temporarily purge a market maker’s quotes in a given option from the montage if they are getting traded against more than the dealer likes.
The market maker itself sets thresholds for removing quotes, based on its tolerance for risk. After a purge, the market maker typically re-enters the market in less than a second with updated quotes.
Although options market makers are required to quote two-sided markets in most of their options for a good portion of the day, they only expect to enter into a certain number of trades within a given time frame, or to trade a certain number of contracts within a given time frame.
When the market moves in an unexpected way and they wind up doing more trades or contracts than expected, dealers want to temporarily exit the market to reprice their merchandise.
To make sure they get out in time, they partly rely on exchange systems like Rapid Fire to monitor their trading activity and shut them down when their trading reaches preset levels.
Unfortunately, the technology at the NYSE was of no help to Ronin in February, when the market maker flooded the NYSE Amex exchange with the mispriced quotes. The parameters were set too generously, and bad trades left the dealer facing a loss of somewhere between $500,000 and $2 million, according to options traders.
Despite the occasional glitch, market makers are generally happy with existing kill switches on options quotes. “There’s very little downside when those switches go off, and they do go off a lot,” said Jerry O’Connell, the chief compliance officer with options market maker Susquehanna International Group, at a recent industry conference. “It allows the firm to provide as much liquidity as they feel they possibly can.”
Given the current focus on creating kill switches in cash equities (see article on Page 18) following the Aug. 1 flood of erroneous orders from market maker Knight Capital, Traders Magazine decided to check in with a couple of the options exchanges to see what new approaches to on/off switches might be in the works.
Tom Wittman runs the options exchanges at Nasdaq, which include Nasdaq OMX Phlx, Nasdaq Options Market and Nasdaq Bx Options. Steve Crutchfield runs the exchanges at NYSE Euronext, which includes NYSE Arca and NYSE Amex.
NYSE: Retooling
NYSE calls its technology the “Market Maker Risk Limitation Mechanism.” The program was originally developed for NYSE Amex in 2009, but now also protects market makers trading on NYSE Arca.
Following the Ronin incident, the exchange operator set out to narrow the constraints of the mechanism and, at the same time, give dealers more control over their risk.
The changes extend its use to non-market makers such as proprietary traders. It can now also be used by market makers for their orders.
Usage of the system is mandatory for market makers generating quotes, but voluntary for prop traders. The changes were completed this summer and rolled out last month.
In general, the changes to the mechanism give users more flexibility and control over how much risk they are willing to tolerate.
For instance, previously, the system only measured a dealer’s exposure by tracking trades. Now it also tracks the number of contracts traded and the percentage of a dealer’s quoted size that gets traded.
Market makers can adjust minimum and maximum parameters to suit their levels of risk tolerance.
In addition, the exchange operator reduced the time frame over which that exposure is measured on both NYSE Amex and NYSE Arca, from one second to a tenth of a second.
Previously, dealers could take themselves out of the market after as few as five trades or as many as 100 trades in a second.
Now, a dealer can turn the lights off after as few as three trades or as many as 20 trades, during that tenth of a second.
As a result, the maximum threshold was reduced from 100 trades to 20. This is intended to prevent a firm from setting the parameter too generously.
“The changes allow our participants to be more selective,” said Crutchfield, NYSE Euronext’s head of U.S. options. “You can imagine that a market maker who is used to trading pretty rapidly might be perfectly fine making 20 trades in a second, but if they make 20 trades within 100 milliseconds, that might be more of a concern. So this allows them to tailor those settings more precisely to situations more likely to be risky for them.”
He added that the changes have increased market-maker confidence, and that some have informed him they are increasing the size of their quotes by 30 percent.
Nasdaq: Expanding ‘Rapid Fire’
The formal name for Nasdaq’s kill switch is the “Risk Monitor Mechanism,” but it’s generally referred to as “Rapid Fire.” If a market maker gets an unexpected “rapid fire” of responses to its Amazon quotes, for instance, those quotes are pulled from the market.
The technology was developed eight or nine years ago by the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, which Nasdaq bought four years ago.
Wittman, now in charge of all three of Nasdaq’s options exchanges, was part of the team at the Philly that developed Rapid Fire.
Back then, the Nasdaq head of U.S. options explained, the problem for market makers was-and still is-getting hit in large amounts on one side of their quote in a short period of time.
Unlike NYSE, Nasdaq uses only one metric-percent of quoted size executed within a given time frame-when determining whether or not to pull a market maker’s quotes. Market makers can set the time to any one-second interval between 1 and 15 and any percentage of their size above 100. So, if the dealer is hit on more contracts than desired within some time frame, the system will temporarily purge his quotes.
Currently, the technology only monitors trading in individual options. But, with concerns increasing over algorithms that can go wild, Nasdaq is exploring extending the functionality of Rapid Fire to cover multiple options.
If it looked like a market maker was in trouble because his pricing model or a counterparty’s liquidity-removing algorithm had gone awry, Nasdaq would shut down the market maker completely.
The firm could only re-enter the market after a human being at the trading house contacted a human being at the exchange.
Currently, the exchange is trying to come up with some metric or metrics that indicate a market maker might be in trouble.
A shutout could be triggered, for instance, if the market maker is getting hit on a certain number of symbols during a given time frame. Or it could be a volume-based indicator that would trigger if the trading house was doing more volume than usual in a certain time frame, Wittman explained.
“So we are looking to expand it to make it a little more comprehensive,” the options exchange manager said. “We’ll add more protections which will then force a human intervention process.”
Nasdaq is involved in discussions with its 35 market makers over what indicators to use.
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Too Many Order Types, Traders Fret
The stock market is unnecessarily complex, and the thousands of exchange order types are partly to blame.
That was a recurring frustration expressed by industry professionals during two weeks of conferences and hearings on the inner workings of the market, held in Washington and New York during September and October.
“We have way too many order types,” Chris Concannon, a partner at market maker Virtu Financial and a former Nasdaq OMX transaction services executive, said at a Senate hearing in September.
The culprit, in the pros’ minds: Regulation National Market System, which requires traders to carry out transactions at the lowest available price across a proliferating number of exchanges and trading venues.
Before Reg NMS, which went into effect in 2007, there were no more than a dozen order types, including market orders, limit orders, time-in-force orders, stop-loss orders, all-or-none orders and those associated with short selling.
That number has swelled into the thousands, practitioners say. BATS Global Markets alone lists more than 2,000, BATS chief operating officer Chris Isaacson told attendees at the Security Traders Association’s annual conference in Washington, D.C., in September.
Despite the large numbers, all those order types are justified, trading officials say, because they help exchanges comply with federal regulations and route orders to other market centers.
“The vast majority of order types are related to routing strategies,” Isaacson also said at the Securities and Exchange Commission’s roundtable on market technology last month. “That’s exchanges routing to each other.”
Still, their necessity hasn’t stilled the complaints or the calls to limit their numbers. At a market structure conference sponsored by Georgetown University in September, there was a call for a moratorium on new order types.
The criticism surrounding the order type explosion is of two types. First, they add undue complexity to the marketplace. Second, they may give speculators and professional traders an advantage over institutions and their brokers. The criticism: More-active traders get access to hidden orders and order types designed to specifically benefit high-speed systems.
“We wonder why someone is trying to make things more complex,” Andy Brooks, head of U.S. equity trading at T. Rowe Price, said at the Senate Banking Committee hearing. “Why do we need so many ways to express trading interest? Is there something else going on? It’s a question that is troubling, and we’re not sure what the answers are.”
The myriad of order types doesn’t just bother traders; it also concerns trading technologists. That became clear during the SEC roundtable on market technology last month.
Held in the wake of this summer’s Knight Capital Group flood of erroneous orders, the regulator used the roundtable to probe operations and technology executives about the problems inherent in developing, testing and deploying the software that underpins the stock market.
“In isolation, most of these order types make sense,” Sudhanshu Arya, global head of liquidity management technology at the brokerage Investment Technology Group, told the SEC. “But the whole suite of order types actually presents a pretty huge challenge for us to actually test through.”
Arya recommended that the burgeoning variety of order types come under some sort of review. That review would examine the amount of volume each one handles and the actual utility of an individual order type.
(c) 2012 Traders Magazine and SourceMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.tradersmagazine.com http://www.sourcemedia.com/